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1. Executive  summary 
Once neglected as a boring but necessary element of dealing in the capital markets, the 
settlement process has caught the attention of both the public and the private sector. 
The rise of emerging markets, the growth of financial markets, the increased focus on cross-
border activity and financial market deregulation in different parts of the world made the 
settlement process considerably more complex but also made investors fully aware that 
operational support systems form a critical part of an effective and efficient capital market. 
Today, the creation of a robust clearing and settlement environment has become the topic of 
many discussions and the recent technological innovation allowed for important 
rationalisation, integration and consolidation trends to emerge. The current fragmented 
infrastructure is increasingly perceived as a source of cost inefficiencies and significant risk. 
As a result, new models are being developed that aim at mitigating risks and containing or 
reducing costs. 
In Section I, we highlight some of the current thoughts in today’s clearing and settlement 
debate, the generally accepted roles and responsibilities of financial intermediaries, as well 
as recommendations made by various national, supranational or private organisations on 
how to develop robust and efficient clearing and settlement systems. 
In Section II, we assess some selected central securities depositories in Asia. The most 
noteworthy observations we have made with regards to the settlement environment in Asia 
can, in our opinion, best be summarised as follows: 
•  The main barriers to developing an efficient bond market in Asia are mainly related 
to the trading environment (ie liquidity constraints and foreign investor restrictions) 
rather than to infrastructure issues. 
•  Today’s clearing and settlement infrastructure in Asia is very fragmented. Even 
though the current setup operates well and conforms with the criteria outlined in the 
US Investor Act of 1940, the infrastructure is not cost efficient and does not mitigate 
risks in the settlement process in a comprehensive manner. 
•  Because of the central role central securities depositories play, it is important that 
the intermediaries be structurally, financially and operationally sound. This entails 
proper supervision by the public sector, an adequate capital base, stringent risk 
management tools (audits, insurance, etc) and business recovery plans. 
•  Central securities depositories should continue to develop and implement true 
delivery versus payment (DVP) systems and provide intraday settlement finality. 
                                                  
1  The information provided is derived from data received from various sources and from the respective 
depositories and is believed to be reliable and accurate. 
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•  The future Asian infrastructure will probably evolve gradually, based on the current 
setup. We anticipate further consolidation within the respective markets, with a 
gradual expansion of cross-border links. 
•  Alternatively, a “central utility” concept could be reviewed. This utility could act as a 
central access point to various markets, providing multicurrency, DVP settlement, 
ideally complemented by an automated securities lending and borrowing facility. 
2. Introduction 
Asia’s domestic markets continue to recover from the fallout of the severe 1997 financial 
crisis and are, today, characterised by more stability and an expectation of growth. GDP in 
Asian countries is expected to expand considerably over the coming years and to outpace 
the growth in other regions, creating important funding and financing requirements. With the 
1997 events fresh in mind, governments and private sector participants are acutely aware of 
the dangers of relying on short-term capital, bank financing and capital inflows denominated 
in foreign currency and subject to foreign exchange fluctuations. 
Asian economies are therefore expected to limit their exposure to these traditional funding 
sources by supplementing them with domestic currency financing alternatives. 
A key feature in creating an investor-friendly environment is the development of an efficient 
capital market, and more specifically a strong and liquid domestic debt market, allowing 
market participants (both borrowers and investors) to attract and invest in longer-term 
financial products. 
Therefore, critical elements required for organising a sound capital market are: 
1.  the creation of a liquid government bond market, providing basic investment and 
funding possibilities and a credible benchmark yield curve to price corporate debt; 
2.  adequate credit rating coverage, by either global (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) or local 
credit rating agencies; 
3.  the implementation of a harmonised taxation and regulatory environment; 
4.  the establishment of operational infrastructure based on efficient and sound clearing 
and settlement mechanisms, central depositories and derivatives markets, as well 
as securities borrowing and lending and repurchase agreement facilities. 
The main drivers of an effective capital market are pricing and demand and supply 
considerations. Increasingly, however, market participants appreciate the importance of an 
adequate support infrastructure. In other words, where capital markets provide the 
fundamental infrastructure to bring investors together, the clearing and settlement 
infrastructure ensures the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. 
The clearing and settlement process is a series of complex tasks that start with trade 
confirmation and continue through the clearing process up to the actual settlement of a trade. 
The successful functioning of this system or series of systems is largely dependent on the 
close interaction of a number of intermediaries, each responsible for a distinct part of the 
process. 
3. Definitions 
The following list presents some of the definitions commonly used in discussion on clearing 
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Clearing. Generally, clearing refers to the process of comparing trades before settlement 
date or the determination of the net obligations of the broker participants (for both securities 
and cash). In certain publications, clearing may be used synonymously with settlement. 
Settlement. The settlement process refers to the exchange of cash and securities on the 
contractual settlement date. The settlement date can be agreed upon at trade execution or 
can be prescribed by local trading conventions. Settlement may be processed on a 
provisional or a final basis. 
Settlement finality. The exchange of cash and securities is final when a settlement can no 
longer be unwound. Finality eliminates the main legal risks of payment and settlement 
systems, reduces systemic risk and ensures the smooth operation of a system. 
Provisional settlement. Provisional settlement allows for onward delivery of securities 
which were not received on a final and irrevocable basis. Systemic risk is introduced in the 
system if the unwinding of a specific settlement has a cascading effect on other previously 
settled transactions. 
Gross settlement. Gross settlement systems settle transactions on an instruction by 
instruction and real-time (RTGS) basis throughout the day. RTGS systems are costly due to 
the need for collateral or available cash balances to cover payment obligations during the 
day or for securities lending programmes to cover short securities positions. RTGS systems, 
however, typically reduce systemic risk. 
Net settlement. In net settlement systems, obligations are settled at the end of the business 
day on a net basis. The net process is subject to potential systemic risk, due to the contagion 
effect where incoming funds are relied upon to make onward payments when a participant 
cannot meet his obligations. As there is no requirement to post collateral or keep cash 
balances readily available during the day, net systems tend to be less costly.  
Central securities depository (CSD). A CSD is either the physical entity or the system that 
facilitates the settlement and safekeeping of securities and ensures the reconciliation of 
participant accounts. Securities can be safekept in immobilised or dematerialised form. 
Settlement generally occurs in book entry form. 
International central securities depository (ICSD). An ICSD is a depository settling trades 
in international and various domestic securities, usually through direct and indirect links with 
agents in the domestic markets. The best known ICSDs are Euroclear Bank and Clearstream 
International. The eurobond market developed in part in response to operational and 
regulatory inefficiencies in domestic bond markets. 
Central counterparty (CCP). A CCP acts as counterparty to every buy and sell trade, a 
process known as “novation”. This process concentrates counterparty risk and provides 
multilateral netting. 
Vertical integration. Vertical integration refers to the merger of institutions providing 
different services in the value chain (eg trading, clearing, CSD). Vertical integration offers 
advantages of scope. 
Horizontal integration. Horizontal integration refers to the merger of institutions providing 
similar services (eg clearing services for equities, derivatives and fixed income instruments). 
Horizontal integration offers advantages of scale. 
Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS™). CLS is a unique process that enables cross-
border currency transactions to be settled intraday. CLS enables settlement to be final with 
payout from central bank funds. As it is a real-time, global settlement system, it will 
significantly reduce the settlement risk caused by delays arising from differences in time 
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Delivery versus payment. Delivery versus payment (DVP) is the simultaneous, final, 
irrevocable and immediately available exchange of securities and cash on a continuous basis 
throughout the day. 
Straight through processing. Straight through processing (STP) is defined in many 
different ways by different segments in the financial industry. In general, it is considered to be 
a process that improves the efficiency of the securities industry by eliminating trade and 
settlement failures, reducing manual processing, decreasing settlement time, etc. 
Section I: Current trends in clearing and settlement 
1.  Clearing and settlement infrastructure 
1.1 Introduction 
It is difficult to unambiguously define the scope or the roles and responsibilities of a clearing 
and settlement intermediary by analysing the current operating models. Market practices, 
CSDs, clearing houses, CCPs and other parts of the clearing and settlement infrastructure 
have developed at different rates, resulting in distinct regulatory, tax and technical 
environments. 
In the infrastructure section, we will cover: 
•  basic clearing and settlement services; 
•  the central counterparty concept; 
•  the clearing and settlement service model; 
•  rationalisation/integration/consolidation: public or private initiatives? 
1.2  Basic clearing and settlement services 
The analysis of various domestic market systems does identify some common and basic 
roles and responsibilities of clearing and settlement providers. 
These services include but are not necessarily limited to: 
• trade  matching; 
• trade  confirmation; 
•  clearing activities (ie netting of obligations); 
•  cash flow distribution; 
•  trade settlement (either on a final irrevocable or provisional basis); 
•  registration (beneficial owner’s name or in a nominee name); 
•  safekeeping of assets and holdings; 
• messaging/reporting; 
•  other services, such as account reconciliation, which are often provided in 
conjunction with local or global custodians. 
1.3 Central  counterparty 
The use of a central counterparty is most prevalent in clearing activities, where, through 
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is commonly recommended that clearing houses be organised as separate legal entities from 
the securities depositories. Even though the CCP can be closely related to a CSD, each 
fulfils different functions and has a distinct role and responsibilities in the clearing and 
settlement process. 
A central counterparty should maintain an adequate capital base and strong risk 
management tools to mitigate its own risks and deal with adverse situations. These tools 
may include, but are not limited to, margin call procedures, settlement of margin calls in 
central bank money, exposure limits, guarantee funds, securities lending and buy-in 
procedures or the use of collateral or daylight overdraft arrangements. 
Introducing a central counterparty has the most tangible effect where trading anonymity is 
required. In market segments where trading occurs over the counter or through market-
makers, traders can effectively mitigate the exposure and risk through a careful selection and 
due diligence of their counterparties. 
The concept has gained importance worldwide and central counterparties have been 
introduced in a number of Asian markets. As illustrated in Annex 4, countries like China (all 
bonds), Indonesia (corporate bonds), Malaysia (corporate bonds) and Thailand (all bonds) 
have integrated a central counterparty into the clearing and settlement infrastructure. 
1.4  The clearing and settlement service model 
Traditionally, clearing and settlement systems have been geared towards the domestic 
market, organised around instrument types (equities, derivatives, fixed income, etc) and 
primarily focused on overcoming imperfections and providing tailor-made solutions to market-
specific issues. 
However, this resulted in a highly fragmented infrastructure, typically exposed to significant 
operating inefficiencies, technical inconsistencies, high cost structures or disparate 
regulatory environments. 
Today, market participants recognise the need for a rationalised or integrated infrastructure 
allowing for an efficient exchange of securities and payments, while at the same time 
ensuring that risks are mitigated and costs are reduced or contained. 
In a fragmented model, several intermediaries each provide part of the clearing and 
settlement services. The challenge, therefore, is to effectively integrate this infrastructure by 
introducing expensive but required regulatory and operational changes. 
In a cross-border trading and settlement context, integration also involves creating full 
interoperability between different domestic systems and providing access to systems outside 
the domestic market. 
Recent technological innovation has made this integration process a more realistic exercise 
as countries continue to adopt international standards and conventions (International 
Securities Identification Number (ISIN) standards or Bank Identification Codes (BIC)), and 
have considerably increased investments in straight through processing (STP) solutions 
(SWIFT or FIX (Financial Information eXchange) protocols). 
1.5  Rationalisation/integration/consolidation: public or private initiatives? 
With all the challenges and expenses to overcome, it is important to identify and assign 
responsibilities to the various participants driving the rationalisation process forward. 
Looking at the various initiatives that have been or are being introduced, the success of the 
clearing and settlement infrastructure rationalisation process is highly dependent on the 
interaction between the private and public sectors. This close cooperation will help achieve 
risk reductions, cost controls and infrastructure efficiencies, as well as system stability and 
robustness. BIS Papers No 30  289
 
In general, the private sector focuses primarily on: 
•  analysing and improving market practices and technical requirements; 
•  the consolidation process itself. 
The public sector, in contrast, tends to be predominantly involved in issues pertaining to: 
•  the harmonisation of tax legislation; 
•  the reconciliation and harmonisation of national laws in a cross-border environment; 
•  the creation of an integrated regulatory and oversight framework; 
•  the implementation of the most cost-efficient, competitive and sound infrastructure; 
•  the oversight of the private sector (intervening if required) to ensure the process is 
resulting in increased efficiencies; 
•  the creation of regulations that provide incentives for providers to innovate. 
As a result, capital markets have evolved significantly over time. In a traditional 
infrastructure, intermediaries are closely related to the government or the main capital market 
participants and operate as a natural or a de facto monopoly. In the government bond 
market, for example, central banks generally provide the central securities depository 
functions. In the more recent models, intermediaries are operating in a market-based 
environment characterised by rationalisation, integration and consolidation. 
2.  Clearing and settlement infrastructure 
2.1 Introduction 
Seeing the importance of the clearing and settlement process in maintaining the systemic 
soundness of the global financial markets, the operating environment has been analysed by 
many international committees and working groups from both the public and private sectors. 
As a result, a range of projects have been initiated to develop and promote securities 
clearing and settlement systems that can operate in a stable and robust environment while at 
the same time reducing risks and costs for their participants. 
The operating, monetary, regulatory and infrastructure observations of individual markets are 
also relevant in a regional context. The barriers encountered in the rationalisation or 
integration process have not halted the progress, but have in some instances slowed it down, 
resulting in regional clearing and settlement systems that are currently at varying stages of 
development, sophistication and integration. 
We will review the clearing and settlement infrastructure and recent developments in: 
•  the United States; 
• Europe; 
• Asia. 
2.2 United  States 
In the United States, a relatively homogeneous clearing and settlement infrastructure has 
been created thanks to the single currency and harmonised regulatory and tax environment. 
US Treasuries are generally settled on an RTGS basis through the Federal Reserve book 
entry systems and are held in dematerialised form. Settlement occurs on a rolling TD+1 
basis, unless otherwise negotiated at the time of trading. The transfer of securities and cash 
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To maintain confidence in the US financial markets, the Federal Reserve Bank continues to 
participate in private sector initiatives and to explore ways of streamlining the design and 
operation of the clearing and settlement process. 
The most recent initiatives are related to CLS procedures and the introduction of Fedwire-like 
services in the settlement procedures of additional instrument types. 
2.3 Europe 
In Europe, the introduction of the euro provided important momentum to the rationalisation 
process of stock exchanges, payment systems and securities clearing and settlement 
structures. Apart from the single currency, the following developments also accelerated the 
process: 
•  the creation of a single integrated and efficient European capital market; 
•  an increase in international capital movements; 
• technological  progress; 
• financial  deregulation. 
The European public institutions involved in this rationalisation effort are the European 
Commission, the European Parliament (as the European legislator) and the European 
System of Central Banks/Committee of European Securities Regulators (ESCB/CESR), 
which combines both central banks and securities regulators. The main requirements that 
have been identified for successfully constructing an integrated clearing and settlement 
model are: 
•  the removal of technical, legal and fiscal barriers, to lower the costs and reduce 
inefficiencies of cross-border settlement; 
•  the removal of competitive distortions/unequal treatment of entities performing 
similar clearing and settlement activities; 
•  the creation of clearing and settlement industry standards to ensure a sound system 
in which risks can be mitigated, reduced or controlled; 
•  a market-led rationalisation process with oversight from the public sector, which 
covers: 
–  following through on changes in local laws and regulations, if required; 
–  remaining vigilant to a particular intermediary emerging as a monopolistic 
entity and ensuring that a system for balancing stakeholders’ interests is 
provided for; 
–  paying special attention to the soundness of the clearing and settlement 
system and to the low-probability catastrophic risks that can introduce 
systemic risks. 
The diagrams in Annex 1 represent the current and future state of the European clearing and 
settlement system, illustrating the complex nature and the extent of the consolidation and 
integration. 
2.4 Asia 
Unlike the United States or Europe, Asia does not have a single currency or a unified market. 
This lack of a homogeneous regulatory and operational environment results in a wide range 
of different market practices and allows “domestic” systems to exist side by side. Where the 
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income markets remain significantly less sophisticated, from both an execution and a support 
perspective. 
Despite the many differences, however, Asia is subject to the same general trends as the 
United States and Europe. Technological advances, deregulation and globalisation increase 
the need to introduce or develop sound capital market and operating systems. The current 
highly fragmented infrastructure, however, is prone to adverse risk factors and high costs. 
Considering the current constraints, it may not be possible or necessary for Asia to introduce 
a fully integrated US- or European-type clearing and settlement model. It would be beneficial 
for Asia, however, to move towards a gradual rationalisation of the domestic and regional 
infrastructure, introducing interoperability between domestic and cross-border systems as 
well as leveraging the various global and private sector initiatives like CLS. 
In the interim, the predominantly domestic infrastructure should focus on increasing 
transparency and implementing optimal execution and operational mechanisms. This will 
allow the current system to increase cost efficiency, provide investors with fast and robust 
execution and processing mechanisms and align the local market with international 
standards. 
Certain countries have started to integrate parts of the clearing and settlement infrastructure, 
achieving economies of scale (horizontal integration) or scope (vertical integration). 
Examples of horizontal integration can be found in Korea, where the Korea Securities 
Depository (KSD) acts as the central depository for all instruments in the market, or in 
Australia, where government bonds were transferred to Austraclear in 2002. The benefits of 
vertical integration are clearly illustrated in Indonesia where, since the introduction of the 
Bank Indonesia - Scripless Securities Settlement System (BI-SSSS), securities are cleared 
and settled in scripless form at Bank Indonesia (BI) and payments occur through the central 
bank’s RTGS system. This is an encouraging trend provided the market remains vigilant in 
assessing the associated risks, related to the creation of a de facto monopolistic situation 
(higher costs) or to the introduction of contagion risk through increased system 
concentration.  
We therefore conclude that due to the specific developments in the Asian markets, domestic 
systems will probably prevail, but that some form of integration can optimise the services 
offered to both local and foreign investors. Another option that could possibly be introduced 
in an Asian context is the utility-type approach, where a central, preferably user-owned, entity 
provides multicurrency central depository services. 
3.  Regulations concerning clearing and settlement structures 
3.1 Introduction 
The challenges that regulators and market participants face in building a robust and efficient 
infrastructure are numerous and complex. Many working groups and regulators have 
contributed extensively to the creation of an operational and regulatory framework in which 
this process can be conducted. 
In the next section, some recommendations and research papers published on the subject 
have been brought together. The main reports that will be briefly discussed are: 
• Global  publications: 
– G30  recommendations; 
– CPSS/IOSCO  report. 
• European  publications: 
– Giovannini  report(s); 292  BIS Papers No 30
 
– ESCB/CESR  report; 
–  the Lamfalussy process (“Committee of Wise Men”). 
•  US rules and regulations: 
–  Rule 17f-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
3.2 Global  recommendations 
3.2.1  G30 recommendations (Annex 2) 
The Group of Thirty (G30) is a private, not-for-profit, international institute composed of 
senior representatives from the private and public sectors and the academic world. The G30 
has been instrumental in creating a common understanding about the structure of a secure 
and efficient clearing and settlement infrastructure. 
The G30 issued a first report on clearing and settlement in 1989, with the principal objective 
of improving local market practices. A second report (Plan for Action) issued in January 2003 
contains 20  recommendations designed to create a robust interoperable global network, 
mitigate risk and improve governance. 
3.2.2  CPSS/IOSCO recommendations (Annex 3) 
In December 1999, a task force launched by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
reviewed and consolidated the work performed by the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS). 
As a result, in 2002, the task force issued 18 recommendations to enhance the safety of, and 
reduce the system risk inherent in, central securities depositories. 
3.3 European  initiatives 
3.3.1 Giovannini  report(s) 
The first Giovannini report was issued in November 2001 and identified 15 technical, market 
practice, legal and fiscal barriers to creating a low-cost cross-border settlement system. Out 
of these 15 barriers, 10 were deemed to be of a legal and regulatory nature (and not due to 
technical constraints or market practice), emphasising the importance of close interaction 
between the public and private sectors. 
A second Giovannini report, issued in April 2003, presented a road map for removing the 
barriers identified in the first report, and assigned action and follow-up responsibilities. 
Finally, the report contained a detailed description of possible consolidation models and 
policy responses. 
3.3.2  ESCB/CESR report (European System of Central Banks/Committee of European 
Securities Regulators) 
In early 2002, the ESCB/CESR consulted the financial industry on how the global 
CPSS/IOSCO recommendations for securities settlement systems should be adapted and 
strengthened to apply to the European marketplace.  
An extra standard has been added to the existing 18 CPSS/IOSCO recommendations 
covering the “custodians operating systematically important systems” notion. 
3.3.3  The Lamfalussy process (“Committee of Wise Men”) 
The Committee of Wise Men was appointed in July 2000 by the European Council of Finance 
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hampered the growth and competitiveness of European securities markets. The committee 
was mandated to identify all obstacles in the securities markets that impede cross-border 
transactions and to suggest remedial actions. 
The final report, issued in 2001, found that important gaps persist in European legislation and 
that the conventional legislative process of the EU is too slow, complex and cumbersome. 
3.4  US rules and regulations 
3.4.1  Rule 17f-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
In 2000, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 17f-7, which 
governs the circumstances under which US investment companies may hold securities 
through the facilities of non-US central securities depositories. 
The key requirement of Rule 17f-7, by reference to Rule 17f-4, is that an investment 
company must receive from its “primary custodian” an analysis of the custody risks 
associated with maintaining assets with each depository it uses. 
Rule 17f-7 does not provide specific guidance concerning the content of these analyses of 
depository custody risk, but in the release announcing the adoption of the rule, the SEC 
stated: 
“As a general matter, we expect that an analysis will cover a depository’s 
expertise and market reputation, the quality of its services, its financial strength, 
any insurance or indemnification arrangements, the extent and quality of 
regulation and independent examination of the depository, its standing in 
published ratings, its internal controls and other procedures for safeguarding 
investments, and any related legal protections.” 
The Bank of New York, as a primary custodian, reviews all depositories in its global custody 
network on their eligibility under Rule 17f-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The 
eligibility requirements as detailed in the rule are that depositories must: 
•  act or operate a system for the central handling of securities or equivalent book 
entries in the country; 
•  be regulated by a foreign financial regulatory authority; 
•  hold assets for the custodian that participates in the system under safekeeping 
conditions no less favourable than the conditions that apply to other participants; 
•  maintain records that identify the assets of each participant and segregate the 
system’s own assets from the assets of participants; 
•  provide periodic reports to its participants with respect to its safekeeping of assets, 
including notices of transfers to or from any participant’s accounts; 
•  be subject to periodic examination by regulatory authorities or independent 
accountants. 
Section II: Analysis of Asian settlement infrastructure 
1.  Asian infrastructure review: methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
In Section II, we shift our attention and assess the situation in Asia, identifying areas of 
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Similar to the other regions, the clearing and settlement infrastructure in Asia has been 
developed and is being continuously refined to reduce the inherent clearing and settlement 
risks and to contain or lower the cost structure. 
When reviewing the specific Asian situation, we focus on risk management aspects, as this 
constitutes a critical component of the investment decision process. In addition, investors’ 
awareness of market infrastructure risk continues to grow. 
1.2  Framework and scope of the Asia review and analysis 
•  As a global custodian, the Bank of New York (BNY) is most intimately involved with 
the settlement and safekeeping functions in the domestic custody markets. As such, 
our analysis will focus on central securities depositories and not on the clearing 
infrastructure. 
•  The review pertains to the fixed income market (government and corporate bonds) 
only. 
•  The analysis is based on BNY’s research on the central depositories’ compliance 
with Rule 17f-7 of the US Securities Investment Act of 1940. Generally, the 
information provided is derived from data received from the respective depositories 
and is believed to be reliable and accurate. 
•  The decision to use the 17f-7 rule criteria in our analysis does not imply any opinion 
on the value and usefulness of the other recommendations as described in the first 
section, but is made primarily based on BNY’s expertise in this area. 
1.3  Risks associated with central securities depository infrastructure 
In general, we believe investors should review and be aware of five broad risk categories 
when assessing whether a central securities depository meets their infrastructure risk 
tolerance. Even though each risk category is reviewed separately, it should be noted that 
risks are typically cumulative and should therefore be looked at on an aggregate basis. 
Risk is only one, albeit critical, part of every due diligence. In addition, it is important to 
remain vigilant to other factors that may impact the depository activity, like scalability and 
remaining excess capacity. This becomes especially important if a depository is considering 
expanding its responsibilities and activities, either by accepting new instruments, through the 
consolidation of depository functions within a given market, or if cross-border activity is 
expected to add substantial volumes to the domestic activity. 
The five broad risk criteria to be reviewed are: 
1.3.1 Market  risk 
Market risk is probably the broadest category and covers generic elements related to the 
market as a whole. In the context of the Asian depositories review, this section will focus on: 
•  the organisational structure of the depository; 
•  immobilisation/dematerialisation of securities. 
1.3.2 Legal  risk 
The regulatory environment and the legal structures covering central securities depositories 
are critical to ensure the safety of the assets and contract enforceability. Features of the legal 
risk review include: 
•  regulations and governance rules covering the depository activity; 
•  enforcement history in case of non-compliance; BIS Papers No 30  295
 
•  compulsory use of the depository; 
•  the liabilities assumed by the central securities depositories; 
•  the asset segregation policies of the depository system; 
•  recourse options when accounts are blocked and assets frozen; 
•  central depository asset lien provisions. 
1.3.3 Credit  risk 
Credit risk is a third important aspect of the risk framework and is considered as a 
combination of: 
•  principal risk: counterparty default. 
•  replacement risk: in case of failed settlement, counterparties may be compelled to 
acquire securities in the marketplace, where prices may have fluctuated. 
•  liquidity risk: required funding is not available to fulfil the payment obligations. 
When looking at credit risk in an infrastructure context, we will focus on: 
•  the membership criteria established by the depository; 
•  the compliance monitoring process; 
•  the disciplinary action available to the depositories when rules are breached; 
•  the existence of guarantee funds and insurance policies; 
•  the credit facilities extended by the depositories to their participants. 
1.3.4 Operational/custody  risk 
This section describes how depositories handle operations risks, and reviews: 
•  the depositories’ performance and functionality; 
•  guarantee funds and insurance policies; 
•  the availability of delivery versus payment (DVP) settlement. 
 
Table 1 
The BIS settlement models 
Model 1  Systems that settle transfer instructions for both securities and funds on a trade by 
trade (gross) basis, with final (unconditional) transfer of securities from the seller to the 
buyer (delivery) occurring at the same time as final transfer of funds from the buyer to 
the seller (payment). 
Model 2  Systems that settle securities transfer instructions on a gross basis, with final transfer 
of securities from the seller to the buyer (delivery) occurring throughout the processing 
cycle, but settle funds transfer on a net basis, with final transfer of funds from the buyer 
to the seller (payment) occurring at the end of the processing cycle. 
Model 3  Systems that settle transfer instructions for both securities and funds on a net basis, 
with final transfers of both securities and funds occurring at the end of the processing 
cycle. 
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1.3.5 Systemic  risk 
Eliminating systemic risk allows depositories to ensure the soundness and robustness of 
their systems, especially to cope with adversities or business interruptions. The question of 
whether a contagion effect can occur through the unwinding of settled transactions is 
addressed in the operational/custody risk section, where we review the settlement methods. 
In this section, we will focus on the central securities depositories’ business recovery plans. 
2.  Asian infrastructure depository analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
We reviewed the risk management tools and processes adopted by selected central 
securities depositories in a country by country analysis. We believe the group of selected 
central securities depositories, although not exhaustive, is representative for the Asian region 




Country by country assessment: markets and depositories 
Country  Central securities depository 
Australia Austraclear 
China   CSDCC Shanghai and Shenzhen
1 
Hong Kong SAR  Central Monetary Unit (CMU) 
India   Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL) 
Indonesia  Bank Indonesia (BI) 
Japan  The Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
Korea  Korea Securities Depository (KSD) 
Malaysia  Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
Philippines  The Bureau of Treasury (BTR) 
The Philippine Central Depository Inc (PCD)
2 
Singapore  The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
Taiwan, China   Central Bank of China (CBC) 
Taiwan Securities Central Depository (TSCD) 
Thailand  The Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
The Thailand Securities Depository Co Limited (TSD) 
1  The current QFII scheme in China may be subject to further changes by the regulators and may affect the 
risk assessment of the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Ltd (CSDCC).     
2  The  PCD 
received a temporary operating licence for debt securities in March 2002 and is expected to become a 
subsidiary of the Fixed Income Exchange, when established (due date 2004). Even though part of the initial 
analysis, all observations concerning the PCD have been excluded from the results, as the PCD is currently not 
used for the safekeeping or settlement of fixed income instruments. 
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2.2  Government bond trading mechanisms 
Even though trading falls outside the scope of this analysis, we found that in certain cases 
the trading and settlement environments are highly correlated and that trading restrictions 
may largely affect the mechanics of the settlement process and the attractiveness of a given 
market. 
When appraising the trading process in the government and corporate bond market, we 
found that fixed income markets are generally less developed compared to the more active 
domestic equity markets. 
Some of the major limitations to foreign investor participation in the markets reviewed are: 
Liquidity constraints 
Bond issues are, for a variety of reasons, taken up by local investors and held to maturity. In 
addition, because of the countries’ budgetary surpluses, Asian governments have 
traditionally not issued large quantities of government paper. Both of these trends have 
affected the development of the market infrastructure considerably and have negatively 
impacted market liquidity. 
•  Australia: Commonwealth Government Securities are popular amongst banks/local 
institutions and form a large part of their statutory liquidity requirements. 
•  Korea: Government bonds are acquired by large investment trust companies, banks 
and life insurance companies to satisfy reserve requirements. The same investors 
also acquire corporate bonds. 
•  Malaysia: Both Malaysian Government Securities (MGS longer tenures) and private 
debt securities (PDS) are typically held till maturity. The local Employees Provident 
Fund (EPF) is a big investor in the fixed income market. 
•  Singapore: About 80-90% of all corporate bonds are acquired by banks and 
insurance companies and are typically held as proprietary positions until maturity. 
•  Thailand: The Bank of Thailand (BOT) generally issues BOT bonds only to financial 
institutions, which use them to satisfy reserve and liquidity requirements. 
Foreign investor restrictions 
In selected countries, foreign investor regulations, restricting foreign participation in the 
market, still apply. Most of these require foreign investors to obtain prior approvals from the 
central bank (mainly foreign exchange-related) or from the regulators (investor status). 
•  China: Foreign participation is only allowed through the QFII (qualified foreign 
institutional investor) scheme and is restricted to exchange-listed Treasury and 
convertible bonds. Stringent capital controls are still in place. 
•  India: Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) must be registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Approved 
investors are allowed to invest up to 30% of the total portfolio in debt instruments. 
Separate approval is required to start a 100% debt fund. 
•  Indonesia: Foreign participation is subject to prior approval from Bank Indonesia (BI) 
and/or Bapepam, the capital markets supervisory agency. Foreign exchange 
transactions must be approved and supported by underlying trade evidence. 
•  Japan:  No direct restrictions apply but foreign investors are subject to stringent 
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•  Korea: Investors must obtain an investment registration certificate from the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS). Korean won can only be purchased to meet exact 
payment obligations. 
•  Philippines: Inward/outward remittances of funds are subject to central bank 
approval. 
•  Taiwan, China (hereinafter Taiwan): Until the new FINI rules replaced the existing 
QFII/non-QFII regulations, foreign investors were only allowed to hold a single cash 
account. As this account was generally used for equity-related transactions, access 
to the fixed income market was effectively barred. Foreign participation in the repo 
market is capped and foreign exchange transactions must be reported to the central 
bank. 
•  Thailand: Same day and next day foreign exchange transactions are prohibited. 
2.3  Current clearing and settlement infrastructure in Asia 
Before taking the analysis to an individual country level, let’s look at the clearing and 
settlement infrastructure in the region as a whole. 
Annex 4 presents a summary of the clearing and settlement infrastructure in selected Asian 
countries for government and corporate bonds. For each country, the central securities 
depositories, the payment system operator, the central clearing counterparty (if applicable) 
and the clearing houses (if applicable) for government and corporate bonds have been 
tabulated. 
Without focusing on specific roles or responsibilities, some interesting trends and 
observations about the organisation of the Asian domestic market infrastructure appear. 
•  A positive trend that has developed in most countries is the creation of formal 
central securities depositories to settle and safekeep all types of securities. In some 
countries, physical scrip still exists, but these instances are generally exceptional, 
and physical securities are being gradually phased out. 
•  Payments are processed either electronically or by cheque. Cheques are used in 
China (partly), Taiwan (partly) and India (across instruments). A further move 
towards the implementation of electronic payment systems, in our view, should be 
encouraged. 
•  Central clearing counterparties are not common. In countries where the concept has 
been introduced, CCPs remain closely linked to either the exchange or the clearing 
house. The feasibility and implications of introducing a central counterparty need to 
be explored in further detail, taking into account specific market mechanics and 
conditions.  
•  Securities clearing generally occurs through separate entities (India, Hong Kong 
SAR, Philippines, Malaysia), licensed clearing banks (Taiwan), depositories (Taiwan 
- selected corporate bonds; Thailand, corporate bonds) or the exchange (Korea). 
•  Usually, different institutions assume the role of CSD, payment system operator, 
CCP and clearing house, depending on the underlying instrument, resulting in a 
highly fragmented environment, which may lead to significant market inefficiencies. 
Exceptions are Australia, China and Korea, where infrastructure is consistent across 
segments. 
•  Within a specific asset class, infrastructure may differ based on the trading methods 
(on exchange or OTC), eg government bonds in Hong Kong or corporate bonds in 
Malaysia, further contributing to the market fragmentation and potential 
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•  Even though payment systems may also differ across segments, the cash 
infrastructure is less fragmented due to central banks’ involvement in the payment 
side. In Malaysia and Thailand, for example, although instruments are held in 
different depositories, payments are processed through the central bank’s RTGS 
system (RENTAS and BAHTNET respectively). 
•  Government bonds are commonly deposited at central banks or their affiliates (Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand), providing the market 
participants with an additional level of comfort with the depository infrastructure. 
•  In the other markets, fixed income instruments are held at depository and clearing 
corporations (China, Hong Kong (selected issues) and Korea), limited liability 
companies (Australia) or licensed clearing banks (Taiwan). 
•  Due to the similar trading conventions, the corporate bond intermediaries are 
generally more closely aligned with the equity than with the government bond 
infrastructure. 
In summary, the domestic clearing and settlement infrastructure in Asia is very fragmented 
and differs significantly across markets and instruments. Central banks play an important role 
as depositories for government bonds, while the corporate bond market infrastructure follows 
the equity market practices and infrastructure setup more closely. 
2.4  Risk reviews of the selected Asian central depositories 
In our assessment, the organisation and structure of the central securities depositories have 
been tested against the various risk categories discussed in Section II.1.3: 
• market  risk; 
• legal  risk; 
• credit  risk; 
• operational/custody  risk; 
• systemic  risk. 
Before going into the specifics of each risk component, it is important to highlight a unique 
aspect of the relationship between the CSD, the local custodian (domestic settlement and 
safekeeping agent) and the global custodian. 
Even though the assets of a particular beneficial owner are held at a CSD, this investor has 
not necessarily entered into a direct contractual relationship with the market provider. If a 
beneficial owner uses a global custodian for its back office operations, these services are 
governed by a specific global custody agreement. 
Generally, to complete the chain through to the CSD, two more contractual/service 
relationships have been set up to service the assets. First, there is the link between the local 
and global custodian, based on a legal contract, and secondly, the relationship between the 
CSD and the local custodian, generally covered by a participant agreement. 
Considering the breadth and width of these cascading relationships, it is critical to adopt a 
strict and continued due diligence process. This review and due diligence practice is 
important not only with regard to the entities with which a direct contractual relationship has 
been established, but also, and probably even more so, with regard to the other 
intermediaries (such as CSDs, payment systems, etc) with which no legal link exists. To do 
this effectively, market specific features must be reviewed carefully and local legal opinions 
may be required in certain cases to validate generally accepted practices in a local market 
context. 300  BIS Papers No 30
 
2.4.1 Market  risk 
As part of the investment decision, investors participating in cross-border trading have to be 
aware of the market risks that investing in foreign markets and jurisdictions may entail. As 
elements related to the organisation and governance of the securities depository may 
contribute to the overall market risk, this section will focus on some of those specific 
elements. 
The organisational structure of the depository 
Understanding the ownership structure of a central securities depository is important for 
assessing its financial strength and support structure. Central banks or government-owned 
entities usually receive the implicit or explicit backing of the government, whereas it is 
important to analyse the financial statements for private entities to fully assess the financial 
soundness of these providers and their ability to deal with default or other adverse event risk. 
From the selected central securities depositories: 
•  three are organised as for-profit private limited liability companies (Austraclear 
(Australia), NSDL (India), TSD (Thailand)); 
•  three are non-profit organisations partly or wholly owned by the exchange (CSDCC 
(China), KSD (Korea), TSCD (Taiwan); the KSD has the widest ownership 
structure); 
•  nine central banks, units of a central bank or entities fully owned by the government 
provide government bond depository services and operate on a non-profit basis 
(CMU (Hong Kong; cost recovery basis), RBI (India), BI (Indonesia), BOJ (Japan), 
BNM (Malaysia), BTR (Philippines), MAS (Singapore), CBC (Taiwan), BOT 
(Thailand)). 
Immobilisation/dematerialisation of securities 
Physical securities are almost non-existent in today’s markets. In general, fixed income 
paper deposited at the CSDs is either held in dematerialised or immobilised form, or a 
combination of the two (depending on the issuer or instrument): 
•  Securities are held in dematerialised form at the CSDCC (China), NSDL and RBI 
(India), BI (Indonesia; for current issues), BOJ (Japan), BNM (Malaysia), BTR 
(Philippines), MAS (Singapore; insignificant portion of physical shares still exists), 
CBC (Taiwan), TSD and BOT (Thailand). 
•  Securities are held in immobilised form at the TSCD (Taiwan). 
•  Instruments deposited at the following depositories are held in either immobilised or 
dematerialised form, depending on the issuer or the instrument: Austraclear 
(Australia), CMU (Hong Kong; EFBs and EFNs are dematerialised, other 
instruments are held in immobilised form at two external settlement banks), KSD 
(93% is dematerialised, the remainder is held in immobilised form). 
2.4.2 Legal  risk 
Regulations and governance rules covering central depository activity 
Considering that the rules under which the depositories are governed may affect the 
outcome of legal disputes or other adverse situations, it is important to gain a fair 
understanding of the depositories’ legal foundation and oversight structure. 
•  Central banks and other government-owned institutions, which are widely 
represented in our selection, are generally self-regulated entities, incorporated 
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and supervision of government-linked commissions or ministries. Examples are 
CMU (Hong Kong), RBI (India), BI (Indonesia), BOJ (Japan), BNM (Malaysia), BTR 
(Philippines), MAS (Singapore), CBC (Taiwan) and BOT (Thailand). 
•  Supervision of the non-central bank entities (Austraclear (Australia), CSDCC 
(China), NSDL (India), KSD (Korea), TSCD (Taiwan), TSD (Thailand)) generally falls 
under the purview of the financial market regulators or government entities 
(ministries or government departments). A common regulator is the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) or its local equivalent. 
Even though the financial regulators in each market keep close oversight over the 
depositories, it remains prudent to ensure that specific contracts entered into by investors or 
their representatives are enforceable under the local laws and regulations.  
Enforcement actions in case of non-compliance 
If central securities depositories fail to comply with the statutory or regulatory requirements, 
the supervisory authorities may resort to remedial or enforcement actions such as imposing 
fines or restricting, suspending or terminating the activities of the depository. All depositories 
in the review stated that no such action had been brought against them in the past three 
years. 
Compulsory use of the depository 
The use of central securities depositories for safekeeping and settlement is required either by 
law or by local market practice. This improves transparency and reduces the risks of 
settlement fails due to timing issues related to the withdrawal or lodgment process. 
The use of the central depository for safekeeping is: 
•  not compulsory: none; 
•  compulsory by law: CSDCC (China); CMU (Hong Kong; EFB/EFN); BI (Indonesia; 
verbal confirmation); BNM (Malaysia); BTR (Philippines); KSD (Korea); CBC 
(Taiwan; government bonds issued after September 1997); 
•  consistent with prevailing market practice: Austraclear (Australia); CMU (HK; other); 
RBI and NSDL (India); MAS (Singapore); TSCD (Taiwan); TSD and BOT (Thailand). 
The use of the central depository for settlement is: 
•  not compulsory: none; 
•  compulsory by law: CSDCC; CMU (EFB/EFN); RBI; NSDL; BI (verbal confirmation); 
BOJ; BNM; BTR; PCD; KSD; TSCD; TSD; CBC (government bonds issued after 
September 1997); 
•  consistent with prevailing market practice: Austraclear; CMU (other); MAS; BOT. 
The liabilities assumed by central securities depositories 
The liability question is important in view of the compulsory nature of safekeeping and 
settlement through most depositories. Apart from the fact that none of the depositories 
assume liability for force majeure, political risks or acts of God, liability language may differ 
substantially across central depositories: 
•  The CSDCC (China), RBI and NSDL (India), BI (Indonesia), BOJ (Japan) and KSD 
(Korea) assume liability for their own performance. 
•  The TSCD (Taiwan) assumes liability for its own performance to the extent that the 
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performance, limited to an amount not exceeding the value of the non-recoverable 
amount plus interest. 
•  Other depositories do not assume liability for their own performance: Austraclear 
(Australia), CMU (Hong Kong: “unless the error is caused by wilful default or gross 
negligence of the HKMA or its servants or agents”), BNM (except for loss of 
participant’s securities) and BTR (Philippines). 
•  In addition, the CMU (Hong Kong), which safekeeps physical certificates for bonds 
and money market instruments at two subcustodians, states that, in the event of a 
loss, the CMU will in the first instance recover its own damages from the payment 
received from the subcustodian, and subsequently distribute compensation to 
affected CMU members. 
•  The Bank of Thailand (BOT) states that it is liable for direct losses related to 
reconciliation errors with registrars and theft of securities, but that it does not 
assume liability for its errors and omissions or failure of its systems, and that it is 
immune from legal action in its own jurisdiction. 
The asset segregation policies of the depository system 
In countries where nominee registration is very common, it is important to understand the 
account setup and asset segregation policies adopted by the depositories, as this may have 
important consequences in cases of default or insolvency. 
•  In all countries reviewed, the depository’s proprietary assets (if any) are separated 
from the participant’s assets. Austraclear, the BOJ and the KSD, explicitly state that 
they do not hold any proprietary assets in the depository system. 
•  In most countries, participants are required to segregate their proprietary and client 
assets. Exceptions are Australia (Austraclear), where segregation at the participant 
level is optional, and Indonesia (BI), where segregation is not allowed. 
•  In general, setting up omnibus accounts is a common market practice. Assets in 
omnibus accounts are usually held on a fully fungible basis and are not identified as 
resident/non-resident holdings, or are not linked to a specific individual investor. 
•  In China (CSDCC), India (NSDL) and Korea (KSD), where foreign investors are 
subject to prior investment approval from the authorities or regulators, assets are 
unambiguously linked to the accounts of an approved underlying foreign investor. 
•  In Japan, the account structures at the BOJ allow for the identification of non-
resident holdings and the beneficial owner’s tax status and liabilities. 
•  In Malaysia (BNM), assets are identified as either resident or non-resident holdings. 
•  In Thailand (BOT), proprietary assets are segregated from client assets. Client 
assets must be segregated per underlying client. 
Recourse options when accounts are blocked or assets are frozen 
Accounts may be blocked or assets frozen when disciplinary action (default/rule violations) is 
brought against a depository participant. It is important for the underlying investors to 
understand how this affects the protection of and access to assets: 
•  In Australia (Austraclear), Hong Kong (CMU) and the Philippines (BTR), access to 
the account by the underlying client is subject to the approval of an 
administrator/liquidator. 
•  In China (CSDCC), India (RBI) and Japan (BOJ), prior approval from the securities 
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•  In Korea (KSD), approval is granted by the securities regulators (FSS). 
•  In Indonesia (BI), Malaysia (BNM) and Thailand (TSD), access is subject to the 
relevant (bankruptcy) legislation. 
•  In India (NSDL), Taiwan (TSCD) and Thailand (BOT), assets are unambiguously 
linked to the underlying investor through the segregated account setup. Client 
accounts, therefore, remain fully accessible at all times. 
Central depository asset lien provisions 
Generally, a depository does not hold liens on assets, except in cases like: 
•  the payment of fees/expenses; 
•  securities encumbrance issues (Austraclear); 
•  settlement defaults (Thailand). 
•  Bank Indonesia stipulates that it has the authority to exercise a lien on a 
participant’s proprietary assets (if required). 
2.4.3 Credit  risk 
The membership criteria established by the depository 
Participant eligibility criteria may vary from market to market. In all the countries analysed, 
however, applicants are subject to stringent rules and regulations outlined in the depository 
membership rules and/or imposed by the applicant’s specific regulator (eg banks must be 
approved by the central bank). In addition, in certain markets, the depository’s parent 
company (Austraclear), the exchange or the securities market regulator (CSDCC) must also 
approve all new membership applications. 
In general, the legal framework governing the relationship between the depository and a 
participant comprises: 
•  a standard participation contract; 
•  terms and conditions of participation; 
•  rules and by-laws of the depository; 
•  relevant domestic laws and regulations. 
The compliance monitoring process 
•  Usually, the depository monitors its participants’ adherence to the membership 
criteria. 
•  In China (CSDCC), India (NSDL), Korea (KSD) and Taiwan (TSCD), the securities 
regulators assist the depository in the monitoring process. 
Disciplinary actions available to the depositories when rules are breached 
It is relatively rare that central securities depositories have to resort to disciplinary action to 
address non-compliance with the rules and regulations governing the CSD/participant 
relationship. However, in cases where action was deemed necessary, appropriate action was 
taken. No details about the specific cases have been disclosed. In cases of non-compliance, 
the central depositories can: 
• impose  fines; 
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In addition, the depositories in Japan (BOJ), India (RBI and NSDL), Korea (KSD) and Taiwan 
have also issued rules that specifically address disciplinary or remedial action in case of 
participant defaults or insolvency. 
During the past three years: 
•  CSDCC Shanghai has taken action to address payment defaults; 
•  RBI (India) took action against participants that did not meet their settlement 
obligations; 
•  the NSDL (India) terminated or suspended seven participants that no longer met the 
net worth criteria or were disbarred from the exchange; 
•  BNM (Malaysia) resorted to disciplinary action and fines (no further details have 
been disclosed); 
•  all other depositories confirmed that no disciplinary or remedial actions have been 
taken against any of their participants. 
The credit facilities extended by the depositories to their participants 
Credit facilities and overdraft lines are important tools in mitigating liquidity and counterparty 
risk as they prevent the settlement activity from being disrupted even if there are not 
sufficient funds available. In most cases, the CSD does not directly extend credit facilities to 
its participants, who must enter into overdraft and credit arrangements with the local 
commercial banks. 
•  Austraclear (Australia), CSDCC (China), CMU (Hong Kong), BOJ (Japan), BTR 
(Philippines), MAS (Singapore), KSD (Korea) and TSCD (Taiwan) specifically 
indicated that they do not extend any credit or overdraft facilities to their participants. 
•  Only BNM (Malaysia) stipulated that it does extend intraday credit to its participants, 
provided sufficient collateral has been posted. 
2.4.4 Operational/custody  risk 
Establishment of guarantee funds and insurance policies 
Guarantee funds 
Most central depositories do not guarantee settlement (as a central counterparty or 
otherwise), but act as agents in the settlement and safekeeping process. As such, they have 
not created any guarantee funds, but mitigate settlement risks through the adoption of true 
delivery versus payment settlement methods. 
•  Austraclear (Australia), CMU (Hong Kong), RBI and NSDL (India), BI (Indonesia), 
BNM (Malaysia), BTR (Philippines - even though settlement of matched transactions 
confirmed by both parties is guaranteed), MAS (Singapore) and the KSD (Korea) 
have not established guarantee funds to cover their daily activities. 
•  CSDCC (China) has set up both a settlement risk (systemic failure) and a settlement 
guarantee fund (participant default). 
•  BOJ (Japan) maintains an investor protection trust (participant default). 
•  TSCD (Taiwan) contributes 5% of its operating income to a “default damaged 
reserve fund” to cover losses of or damage to share certificates under custody. 
•  TSD (Thailand) acts as a central counterparty to trades between clearing members 
of the exchange only, and has established a credit line with the settlement banks to 
cover settlement default. Settlement between custodian banks and their 
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Guarantee funds are more common in a trading and clearing environment. If a guarantee 
fund has been created, it is important to evaluate the fund’s size, payout criteria and 
replenishment schedules to ensure the available resources are adequate to mitigate the risks 
they cover. 
•  In India, CCIL (Clearing Corporation of India Ltd) and the respective clearing houses 
related to the respective stock exchange assist the depositories in the settlement 
process and maintain guarantee funds to mitigate associated risks. 
•  In Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, the stock exchanges maintain guarantee funds to 
compensate losses resulting from a member’s default. 
Insurance policies 
If guarantee funds are not available, it is important to review the insurance policies a CSD 
has arranged to protect itself and its participants against adverse events. When analysing the 
available policies, it is important to focus on the policy coverage and carrier, the amounts 
insured and the applicable deductible amounts to assess the risk-mitigating capacity of the 
specific policies. 
•  The central banks or linked depositories in our review (CMU (Hong Kong), RBI 
(India), BI (Indonesia), BOJ (Japan), BNM (Malaysia), BTR (Philippines) and MAS 
(Singapore)) typically do not maintain third-party insurance policies. 
•  Of the non-central banks, only CSDCC (China) does not maintain insurance. 
•  NSDL (India), KSD (Korea), TSCD (Taiwan) and TSD (Thailand) maintain insurance 
policies to meet claims arising from their depository services and performance. 
Performance and functionality 
Functionality 
For participants and underlying investors, it is important to understand how a CSD is 
organised from a functional point of view, and whether risk is concentrated within the CSD or 
is further disseminated to third-party providers through outside vendor/contractor 
relationships. 
•  Austraclear (Australia), CSDCC (China), NSDL (India), BNM (Malaysia), BTR 
(Philippines), MAS (Singapore), KSD (Korea), TSCD (Taiwan) and the TSD 
(Thailand) handle all functions related to depository responsibilities in-house and do 
not outsource any activities to third party providers. 
•  CMU (Hong Kong) provides all depository functions in-house except for the 
safekeeping of physical certificates (private subcustodians) and computer 
processing (HK Interbank Clearing Limited). 
•  RBI (India) provides services internally except for netting services and the 
computing of participant obligations of certain trades, which is outsourced to the 
clearing house CCIL. 
•  BOJ (Japan) performs all functions internally except for communications, for which it 
employs NTT, the national telephone carrier. 
Communication procedures 
Most depositories communicate with their participants through either: 
• proprietary  technology; 
•  secure dial-up or leased connections;  
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Control procedures and performance history 
All depositories have implemented stringent internal control procedures, mitigating 
operational risk. During the past three years, no adverse performance has been reported that 
resulted in system disruptions of significant proportions. 
Audits 
When reviewing the performance, functionality and overall stability of market intermediaries 
and providers, it is important to complement proprietary due diligence results with feedback 
provided in both internal and external (independent) audit reviews: 
•  Central banks, as self-regulated entities, are generally subject to statutory audit 
reviews by the government and to internal audit reviews. 
•  Some central banks (eg RBI - India) reported only a statutory audit requirement. 
•  Austraclear (Australia), CSDCC (China) and CMU (Hong Kong) are subject to both 
internal and external audits. 
•  The NSDL (India) is subject to regular external and ad hoc regulatory (SEBI) audits. 
•  The KSD (Korea) is subject to annual internal/external and regulatory (FSS) audits. 
•  The TSCD (Taiwan) is subject to four levels of audit (internal, external and 
regulatory (SFC), as well as an operational audit on its computer systems). 
•  The TSD (Thailand) is audited annually by the SET internal auditor (operational), 
twice a year by external auditors (financial), and is subject to an occasional audit by 
the SEC. 
In addition, risk management policies of the CSDCC (China), CMU (Hong Kong), NSDL and 
RBI (India) and the BOJ (Japan) are reviewed separately by specifically appointed risk 
review committees. 
Even though audit reports were not always made available for review, the depositories stated 
that during the last audit no material exceptions were found. Only the NSDL (India) reported 
that minor exceptions were found (no further details are available). 
Data security 
All depositories have implemented rigorous safeguards to ensure data security and 
protection, such as unique passwords and user IDs (subject to regular change) and lockout 
facilities, and depositories holding physical certificates employ guards to protect the vaults. 
Availability of delivery versus payment settlement 
The settlement process is the source of a variety of important risks and should therefore be 
carefully analysed when assessing the soundness and safety of a central securities 
depository. In view of the importance of this section, a detailed description of the settlement 
process and some of the risk mitigators addressing certain aspects of the operational 
processes for each country/depository in the analysis has been included in Annex 5. 
2.4.5 Systemic  risk 
The establishment of business recovery plans 
All depositories have detailed business recovery plans in place covering physical equipment, 
software and data security as well as organisational structure. Most depositories also have 
backup locations where business can be resumed if normal activity has been disrupted. 
Exceptions to this rule are the KSD (Korea; planned for 2004) and the RBI (India), where 
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details of the business continuity and recovery plans are not divulged to the public for 
security reasons. 
In most instances, data are backed up electronically and stored off-site. Most depositories 
have a documentation retention policy ranging between five (one case) and 20 years (one 
case). The most common retention periods are either seven or 10 years. RBI (India) and BI 
(Indonesia) did not disclose their retention policy guidelines. 
Operational procedures are generally tested on a regular basis (at least once a year). 
Results are usually not disclosed, or disclosed only in broad terms or in local language 
(CSDCC (China), BOJ (Japan)). In some cases, testing frequencies are not divulged 
(CSDCC Shanghai). MAS (Singapore) publishes full test results. 
In case of a failure, the depositories have comprehensive communication policies to inform 
the public and the authorities as well as the regulators. 
The backup facility can generally be activated within one to four hours. KSD (Korea) 
confirmed backup facilities can be made operational within three hours, NSDL (India) 
reported a 24-hour required lead time and the TSCD (Taiwan) a four-to eight-hour required 
lead time. 
None of the depositories has had to activate the emergency plans during the past three 
years, except for the TSCD (Taiwan; no details have been provided). 
2.4.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of Asian central securities depositories reveals, in our opinion, that the 
depositories reviewed comply with the criteria outlined in Rule 17f-7 of the US Investment Act 
of 1940. The structural and operational framework appears to be on a level consistent with 
that of other central securities depositories serving comparable securities markets. 
As outlined, the broad criteria that depositories must comply with to be considered an eligible 
central securities depository under rule 17f-7 are: 
•  acting as a system of central handling of securities; 
•  being regulated by a financial regulatory authority; 
•  holding assets of all participants on equivalent terms; 
•  identifying and segregating participant assets; 
•  reporting periodically to participants; 
•  being examined at regular intervals by a regulator or independent accountant. 
Some of the most noteworthy criteria we should retain from the above analysis are that 
depositories should: 
•  consolidate the depository functions to service all securities in a domestic market; 
•  create real-time RTGS processing models, as these effectively mitigate risks, even 
though they tend to be more costly due to the liquidity requirements; 
•  set up effective support systems, such as securities lending and access to credit 
facilities, to ensure the system’s efficiency and effectiveness; 
•  confirm trade details early on in the process and harmonise settlement cycles to 
allow further efficiencies; 
•  establish integrated and real-time links with the payment systems; 
•  remove physical certificates from the financial system and keep securities in 
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•  safeguard the soundness of the system by segregating proprietary and client assets 
and by adopting enhanced risk management tools, such as insurance or guarantee 
funds; 
•  subject the infrastructure and its external links to periodic independent reviews. 
Payment systems should: 
•  be centralised, with a single payment system responsible for settlement-related 
payments; 
•  be fully integrated with the securities depository; 
•  still be owned, operated or closely linked with the central bank to allow payments to 
be made in central bank funds; 
•  be structured as RTGS or continuous net settlement systems; 
•  allow for electronic transfers using secure systems achieving same day value and 
finality. 
Other important observations we made relate to: 
•  Validation of a depository’s financial strength: This validation is made either through 
the review of financial statements, ownership structure or risk management tools. 
Asia’s government bond settlement infrastructure is still largely concentrated with 
central banks or affiliates, for which this information may not be readily available. 
  Central banks remain fundamental to the servicing of government bonds and for the 
operation of the payment systems because they: 
–  act as neutral participants at the centre of the system; 
–  receive a seal of confidence from the market; 
–  retain important oversight functions in order to: 
•  maintain the safety of payments and the payment system; 
•  maintain the safety of the clearing and settlement system; 
•  promote the clearing and settlement system’s efficiency. 
  The corporate bond market has evolved towards the use of non-central bank 
intermediaries, in line with the practices identified in the equity markets, for which 
financial statements and ownership information can be more easily obtained. 
•  Mitigation of systemic risk: A critical element in an environment where CSDs 
become more widespread and the technology advances rapidly. Default in one part 
of the payment, clearing, settlement and safekeeping system may cause a 
contagion effect and affect the entire clearing and settlement infrastructure. 
  The soundness of the overall operating and regulatory framework and the 
depositories’ business recovery plans are important elements in all due diligence 
reviews. We have not found any major shortcomings with regard to regulatory or 
business recovery issues in our analysis. Only the fact that the KSD (Korea) and 
RBI (India) have their main and backup centres on the same premises is perceived 
as a potential source of risk. 
•  Internal and external audit reviews: these reviews are important in assessing the 
depositories’ operating processes. Traditionally, central banks have not been 
subject to the same rigorous audit requirements as privately operated 
intermediaries. However, the assumption that they enjoy the backing of their 
respective governments in case of adverse events alleviates some of these 
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  Possible general areas for improvement on the audit requirement are to: 
–  include audit reviews of the interlinked operating systems, such as payment 
systems or clearing houses; 
–  publish the audit results to make them freely available for external review. 
•  Asset exposure risk: These risks are mainly contained through the implementation 
of true DVP and RTGS systems. Austraclear (Australia), CMU (Hong Kong; real-
time settlement), BOJ (Japan; DVP settlement), BNM (Malaysia), MAS (Singapore) 
and TSD (Thailand) have implemented real-time gross settlement systems. 
  In countries where no true DVP systems are available, additional measures have 
been put in place to address the liquidity and asset exposure risk. 
–  In Hong Kong (CMU), under the batch settlement mode, securities are put on 
hold until payments have been confirmed. 
–  In the Philippines (BTR) and Thailand (BOT), investors face intraday exposure 
due to the timing differences of the cash and securities settlement process. 
–  In China (CSDCC) and Taiwan (TSCD), securities, transferred on settlement 
date, become available to the investor the next day, when the payment has 
been confirmed. 
–  In India at the NSDL, an intraday exposure exists due to the timing differences 
between the pay-in and payout schedules. 
–  At the Reserve Bank of India, if settlement occurs through RBI accounts, no 
exposure exists. However, if cash settlement occurs outside the RBI, timing 
lags and exposures exist. 
•  The applicable settlement cycles: Most countries have adopted a TD+3 (at the 
latest) rolling settlement cycle for fixed income instruments, which corresponds to 
the generally accepted G30 time frame. 
  Some authorities are considering shortening the settlement cycle to limit the market 
and foreign exchange risks created by possible price fluctuations. Even though this 
risk reduction effect is highly desirable, in order to attract foreign investors, it is 
important to keep settlement cycles aligned with the foreign exchange contract 
timing to allow timely and proper funding of the cash accounts. 
•  Liquidity risk: Gross and net settlement systems are subject to different risks. The 
mechanics of a gross RTGS settlement system, for example, create larger liquidity 
exposures, which call for proper risk management tools. 
–  In most countries, credit facilities are not available through the central 
depositories directly, but through the domestic commercial banks. 
–  In Malaysia, lending facilities are not available to foreign investors. 
–  In India (NSDL), there is only limited securities lending activity (not allowed for 
foreign investors) and the access to credit is uncertain. 
–  In China (CSDCC), liquidity risk is mitigated through securities lending 
programmes and the existence of guarantee funds. 
–  In Japan (BOJ), liquidity risk may arise under the non-DVP settlement method. 
These risks are addressed by making intraday credit limits available. 
–  Both in Thailand (BOT), for BAHTNET users, and Malaysia (BNM), the 
depositories themselves extend credit to their participants. 
–  In Indonesia, access to credit facilities is restricted, even through commercial 
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–  In Taiwan (TSCD), some risk elements are present, as participants only have 
limited access to securities lending facilities. 
–  In Korea (KSD), the fail-related lending programmes maintain stability in the 
market. 
–  In the Philippines and India, the use of cheques to make settlement-related 
payments introduces a risk element in the settlement process. 
–  The introduction of a repo market in China is considered as a positive 
development. 
•  Counterparty risk: 
–  Through their design, RTGS settlement systems eliminate counterparty risk. 
–  Central depositories typically mitigate counterparty risk by implementing 
rigorous participant membership criteria and adopting stringent membership 
monitoring tools. 
–  If settlement is postponed due to insufficient balances of securities or cash, 
principal risk is taken out of the system but is replaced by market risk. 
–  Failed settlements may attract market risk and expose counterparties to 
consequential losses. In Hong Kong (CMU), for example, failed trades are 
automatically cancelled from the system at the end of the day and must be 
re-entered. 
–  Central depositories generally do not act as a central counterparty, except for 
TSCD (Taiwan), CSDCC (China) and BOT (Thailand; payments only). As 
such, counterparty exposure is reduced and guarantee funds have generally 
not been put in place. 
–  Where guarantee funds have been implemented to safeguard financial 
stability, it is important to analyse the size, payout criteria and loss-sharing 
provisions of the fund. 
–  Central banks typically do not enter into settlement assurance provisions or 
guarantee fund arrangements. 
–  In both India and the Philippines, cheque use creates counterparty risk on 
payment banks. 
In summary, we believe it is fair to conclude from the analysis that most countries are 
continuously looking at enhancing the clearing and settlement infrastructure to mitigate risks 
and reduce or contain costs. An illustration of this trend can be found in the implementation 
of the BI-SSSS in Indonesia. With the introduction of this scripless settlement system, the 
DVP, liquidity and operational risks inherent in the previous manual processes have been 
effectively mitigated. 
2.5  Possible future central securities depository models for Asia 
2.5.1 Introduction 
After reviewing a selected number of central depositories in the region and the conclusions 
we have drawn, it is important to look at how the infrastructure could evolve over time. 
Based on the observations about the current Asian models and taking into account trends 
around the world, we would like to review the following three options: 
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•  a full integration/consolidation model; 
•  a private, central institution linked to the domestic market infrastructure. 
2.5.2  Interlinked depositories with open access 
In this model, links are established between the different providers, allowing for partial 
consolidation and a high degree of interoperability. This model can be seen as a first step 
towards full integration (please refer to the next paragraph). 
Advantages 
•  Compared to a highly fragmented infrastructure, this model allows for partial risk 
mitigation (systemic, market, operational and liquidity risks) and potential cost 
efficiencies. 
•  Competitive element is retained through the coexistence of several providers. 
•  Implementation of increased transparency. 
Disadvantages 
•  Investors/participants are required to establish memberships at various systems. 
•  Investment in interoperability is required - interoperability refers to technical 
compatibility of systems but also includes standardised communication/messaging, 
fees, contracts and procedures. 
•  Each component of the system must be efficient to ensure stability and robustness 
of the entire system. 
•  The ongoing costs of existing separate entities (maintenance and innovation) remain 
- there are few economies of scale. 
•  The costs associated with linking multiple back office systems are important. 
•  The integration of the component systems may be complex. 
2.5.3 Full  consolidation 
A fully consolidated model, either within a given market or regionally (United States/Europe) 
requires close oversight by the authorities and the regulators to ensure a smooth functioning 
of the system. The integrated entity must be sound, backed with the necessary financial 
strength, and have stringent risk management tools and a strong and wide acceptance from 
participants. Generally, standardised and integrated processes reduce some of the major 
risks created in a fragmented environment. 
Advantages 
•  Full integration provides important economies of scale. 
•  Economies of scale promote cost efficiencies. The absence of duplication of 
processes and investment reduce the required fixed and ongoing maintenance 
costs. 
•  Largest incentive to innovate and provide wider range of services (eg portfolio 
services). 
Disadvantages 
•  Most expensive/complex structure to develop (system and processing 
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•  Political/regulatory support required. Need for complex regulatory/taxation change. 
•  Important trade-off between full integration and increased systemic risk due to over-
reliance on a single system and increased risks related to a lack of competition. 
•  Oversight is required to promote and ensure continued improvements to the system. 
The monopolistic situation may result in a lack or absence of incentives to innovate. 
•  On a pan-Asian basis, harmonised or streamlined processes within a given asset 
class (eg  settlement cycles) are preferred as this facilitates the consolidation 
process and achieves the highest savings for the investors. 
2.5.4  Private, central institution linked to domestic market infrastructure 
The option of a central institution linked to the local market infrastructure (CSD, CCP, 
clearing house) is most valuable in a multicurrency environment (cross-border), and mimics 
the setup of an international central depository. 
The utility should establish links through its local agents and its users, should be industry-
owned and should either provide all services in-house or contract with various third-party 
entities to provide selected services. In order to provide all services in-house, this utility has 
to be organised as a bank to offer cash and credit-related services. 
Where traditionally domestic central depositories do not have a banking licence and settle 
cash through central bank accounts, the central banks’ involvement in a multicurrency 
environment becomes impractical, due to differences in time zone, timing and cutoff time. 
The utility could address this by offering settlement services using commercial bank money, 
through the recently launched Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) infrastructure. 
The utility model requires complex regulatory arrangements, stringent and multiple 
risk/concentration/ business recovery measures and acceptance from the participant and 
user communities. 
2.5.5 Conclusion 
When reviewing the outlook for Asia, it is important to evaluate risks in an integrated 
environment and in the current context. Today, Asia is a very fragmented region with large 
differences between the infrastructures servicing specific instrument types. 
The domestic markets are continuing to evolve, as witnessed by the introduction of certain 
functionality or initiatives in various markets: 
•  establishment of rating agencies for corporate bonds (India and Indonesia); 
•  implementation of the BI-SSSS (Indonesia). 
Future enhancements are being prepared to further enhance the development of the bond 
markets: 
•  STP processing (Australia); 
•  the expansion of international links and cooperation agreements (Hong Kong); 
•  introduction of the central counterparty concept for bond clearing (Japan, Thailand); 
•  a proposal to develop a long-term bond market and benchmark yield curve (Korea); 
•  introduction of a local fixed income exchange (Philippines); 
•  launch of 10-year government bond futures contract in January 2004 (Taiwan); 
•  a plan to move the TSD towards a T+2 settlement cycle (Thailand); 
•  TSD’s development of a Post Trade Integration Project, aimed at integrating all 
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•  TSD’s plan to extend its service offering to include bonds and to focus on STP 
processing initiatives (Thailand). 
These initiatives streamline the domestic markets and offer a more robust and efficient 
infrastructure, focused on risk reduction and cost efficiencies. 
The choice of the future path for the clearing and settlement infrastructure will be based on a 
trade-off between risk management, efficiency and costs, while at the same time 
implementing a system best suited for potential growth of the market. 
Where domestic markets become more sophisticated, depositories could start playing a 
bigger role in the servicing of foreign investors’ portfolios. 
To be successful, Asian markets must overcome certain barriers, such as: 
•  technology interfaces: standardised communication and automation are critical in 
the development process and proprietary systems should be phased out. 
•  need for intraday finality: this will eliminate the need for expensive collateral or 
maintaining idle cash balances, reducing both funding cost and liquidity risks. 
•  systems linkage: links must be established allowing information transfers on a risk-
free and efficient basis. 
•  differences in market mechanics: eliminate differences in settlement periods 
between instruments and adopt common market practices. 
•  regulatory divergence: harmonise the legislation applicable to all relevant market 
segments and encourage cooperation between the public and private sectors. 
Rationalising the depository functionality may lead to integration or consolidation, but could 
potentially give rise to monopolistic issues, especially if the remaining entity is organised as a 
private, for-profit entity. Authorities must therefore implement appropriate oversight 
procedures to prevent upward cost pressures and to encourage continued innovation. 
Taking into account the highly fragmented environment, we believe it is fair to say that the 
clearing and settlement environment is most likely to develop gradually, either by linking the 
local infrastructures or by introducing a “central utility”. A steady move towards closer 
consolidation may be a next logical next step, but based on the important differences 
between the regulatory, operational and taxation laws in the respective markets, it is unlikely 
that a full regional consolidation/integration is possible. 314  BIS Papers No 30
 
Annex 1: 
European clearing and settlement environment 
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G30 recommendations (1) 
Recommendation 1a  Trade comparisons between direct market participants by T+0 
Recommendation 1b  Matched trade details should be linked to the settlement system 
Recommendation 2  Indirect market participants to achieve affirmation by T+1 
Recommendation 3a  Central depository, broadest possible participation 
Recommendation 3b  Widest possible range of depository eligible instruments 
Recommendation 3c  Immobilisation/dematerialisation to the utmost extent possible 
Recommendation 3d  Compatible rules and practices in case of multiple CSDs 
Recommendation 4a  Real-time gross settlement system 
Recommendation 4b  Trade netting system as per “Lamfalussy recommendations” 
Recommendation 5  Delivery versus payment as defined by ISSA 
Recommendation 6a  Same day funds for securities settlement 
Recommendation 6b  Same day funds for the servicing of securities portfolios 
Recommendation 7a  A rolling settlement system should be adopted by all markets 
Recommendation 7b  Final settlement for all trades by T+3 
Recommendation 8a  Securities lending and borrowing should be encouraged 
Recommendation 8b  Existing regulatory and taxation barriers should be removed 
Recommendation 9a  ISO Standard 7775 (securities messages) 
Recommendation 9b  ISO Standard 6166 (ISIN numbering system) 
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Table 4 
G30 recommendations (2) 
Recommendation  1  Eliminate paper and automate communication, data capture and 
enrichment 
Recommendation 2  Harmonise messaging standards and communication protocols 
Recommendation 3  Develop and implement reference data standards (SWIFT, ISIN, BIC) 
Recommendation 4  Synchronise timing between different clearing and settlement systems 
and associated payment and foreign exchange systems 
Recommendation 5  Automate and standardise institutional trade matching 
Recommendation 6  Expand the use of central counterparties 
Recommendation 7  Permit securities lending and borrowing to expedite settlement 
Recommendation 8  Automate and standardise asset servicing processes, including 
corporate actions, tax relief arrangements and restrictions on foreign 
ownership 
Recommendation 9  Ensure financial integrity of providers of clearing and settlement 
services 
Recommendation 10  Reinforce the risk management practices of users of clearing and 
settlement service providers 
Recommendation 11  Ensure final, simultaneous transfer and availability of assets 
Recommendation 12  Ensure effective business continuity and disaster recovery planning 
Recommendation 13  Address the possibility of failure of a systematically important institution 
Recommendation 14  Strengthen assessment of the enforceability of contracts 
Recommendation 15  Advance legal certainty over rights to securities, cash or collateral 
Recommendation 16  Recognise and support improved valuation and closeout netting 
arrangements 
Recommendation 17  Ensure appointment of appropriately experienced and senior board 
members 
Recommendation 18  Promote fair access to securities clearing and settlement networks 
Recommendation 19  Ensure equitable and effective attention to stakeholder interest 
Recommendation 20  Encourage consistent regulation and oversight of clearing and 
settlement service providers 
 






Standard 1  Legal framework 
Securities settlement systems should have a well founded, clear and 
transparent legal basis in the relevant jurisdictions. 
Standard 2  Trade confirmations and settlement matching 
Confirmation of trades between direct market participants should occur as 
soon as possible after trade execution, but no later than trade date (T+0). 
Where confirmation of trades by indirect market participants (such as 
institutional investors) is required, it should occur as soon as possible after 
trade execution, preferably on T+0, but no later than T+1. 
Standard 3  Settlement cycles 
Rolling settlement should be adopted in all securities markets. Final 
settlement should occur no later than T+3. The benefits and costs of a 
settlement cycle shorter than T+3 should be evaluated. 
Standard 4  Central counterparties 
The benefits and costs of a CCP should be evaluated. Where such a 
mechanism is introduced, the CCP should rigorously control the risks it 
assumes. 
Standard 5  Securities lending 
Securities lending and borrowing (or repurchase agreements and other 
economically equivalent transactions) should be encouraged as a method 
for expediting the settlement of securities transactions. Barriers that inhibit 
the practice of lending securities for this purpose should be removed. 
Standard 6  Central securities depositories 
Securities should be immobilised or dematerialised and transferred by book 
entry in CSDs to the greatest extent possible. 
Standard 7  Delivery versus payment 
CSDs should eliminate principal risk by linking securities transfers to funds 
transfers in a way that achieves delivery versus payment. 
Standard 8  Timing of settlement finality 
Final settlement should occur no later than the end of the settlement day. 
Intraday or real-time finality should be provided where necessary to reduce 
risks. 
Standard 9  CSD risk controls to address participant defaults 
CSDs that extend intraday credit to participants, including CSDs that 
operate net settlement systems, should institute risk controls that, at a 
minimum, ensure timely settlement in the event that the participant with the 
largest payment obligation is unable to settle. The most reliable set of 
controls is a combination of collateral requirements and limits. 318  BIS Papers No 30
 
Table 5 (cont) 
CPSS/IOSCO recommendations 
Standard 10  Cash settlement assets 
Assets used to settle the ultimate payment obligations arising from securities 
transactions should carry little or no credit or liquidity risk. If central bank 
money is not used, steps must be taken to protect CSD members from 
potential losses and liquidity pressures arising from the failure of the cash 
settlement agent whose assets are used for that purpose. 
Standard 11  Operational reliability 
Sources of operational risk arising in the clearing and settlement process 
should be identified and minimised through the development of appropriate 
systems, controls and procedures. Systems should be reliable and secure, 
and have adequate, scalable capacity. Contingency plans and backup 
facilities should be established to allow for timely recovery of operations 
and completion of the settlement process. 
Standard 12  Protection of customer’s securities 
Entities holding securities in custody should employ accounting practices 
and safekeeping procedures that fully protect customers’ securities. It is 
essential that customers’ securities be protected against the claims of a 
custodian’s creditors. 
Standard 13  Governance 
Governance arrangements for CSDs and CCPs should be designed to fulfil 
public interest requirements and to promote the objectives of owners and 
users. 
Standard 14  Access 
CSDs and CCPs should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for 
participation that permit fair and open access. 
Standard 15  Efficiency 
While maintaining safe and secure operations, securities settlement 
systems should be cost-effective in meeting the requirements of users. 
Standard 16  Communication procedures 
Securities settlement systems should use or accommodate the relevant 
international communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate 
efficient settlement of cross-border transactions. 
Standard 17  Transparency 
CSDs and CCPs should provide market participants with sufficient 
information for them to identify and evaluate accurately the risks and costs 
associated with using the CSD or CCP services. 
Standard 18  Regulation, supervision and oversight 
Securities settlement systems should be subject to transparent and 
effective regulation and oversight. Central banks and securities regulators 
should cooperate with each other and with other relevant authorities. 
Standard 19  Risks in cross-border links 
CSDs that establish links to settle cross-border trades should design and 
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Annex 5: 
Settlement process in Asian countries 
BIS settlement models: 
Model 1:  Securities and funds are transferred on a simultaneous, irrevocable and real-time 
gross settlement (RTGS) basis. 
Model 2:  Securities are settled on a gross basis and cash is settled on a net basis. 
Model 3:  Both securities and cash are exchanged simultaneously on a net basis once a day. 
Australia: Austraclear 
Settlement process: BIS Model 1 
•  Settlement cycle: negotiable but generally on a rolling TD+3 basis. 
•  Availability of securities is checked in seller’s account and position earmarked. 
•  If sufficient funds are available, settlement occurs in Austraclear. 
•  Transactions which would create a securities shortfall are rejected. 
•  Payment: via a feeder system to the central bank’s RTGS system. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: required but not legally binding. Matched but unsettled trades are 
automatically deleted at the end of the settlement day. 
•  Securities lending: allowed in the market but not offered by Austraclear. 
•  Buy-in: there are no established buy-in procedures for debt instruments. 
China: China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Ltd (CSDCC) 
Settlement process: similar to BIS Model 2. Note: net fund movement occurs on the day after 
the final movement of securities. 
•  Settlement cycle: securities are settled on TD on a gross trade-by-trade basis; cash 
is paid on a net basis on TD+1. 
•  On the evening of TD, CSDCC transfers shares on a final and irrevocable basis. 
•  On TD+1, funds are transferred to and from the clearing bank designated by the 
CSDCC. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: unclear whether a prematching or affirmation process is active. 
•  Brokers check the availability of securities/cash with the QFII’s appointed custodian 
bank before executing trades. Trades are rejected in the event of insufficient 
holding. 
•  Once executed, the trades are binding on the brokers. 
•  Securities lending: short-selling, securities lending and borrowing are not allowed. 
•  Buy-in: no buy-in/sell-out rules. In case of overdraft, CSDCC imposes interest 
penalties based on the amount of the overdraft and holds securities as collateral.  
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•  The depository acts as the central counterparty for all participants and guarantees 
both securities and cash settlements. 
Hong Kong: Central Monetary Unit (CMU) 
Settlement process 
•  Settlement cycle: negotiable. Generally, trades executed in the morning are settled 
on the same day, while those executed in the afternoon are usually settled the next 
day. 
•  Settlement can be effected using the real-time or the batch settlement method. 
Under both methods, cash and securities move simultaneously. Transfers are final 
and irrevocable. 
•  Payment happens through CMU interface with the real-time interbank payment 
system, known as the Clearing House Automatic Transfer System (CHATS). 
Settlement process: real-time settlement - BIS Model 1 
•  Instructions are automatically matched by CMU and securities are put on hold. 
•  Once payment is confirmed to the CMU, the securities are released. 
•  In the event of insufficient securities, trades are transferred to the end-of-day batch 
settlement process. 
•  If insufficient funds are available, transactions remain pending until funds are 
available. 
Settlement process: batch settlement - BIS Model 3 
•  At 3.30 pm, the end-of-day batch run starts. 
•  Net settlement obligations (securities and cash) calculated and available balances 
checked. 
•  Settlement occurs if sufficient funds and securities are available. 
•  Failed transactions are cancelled at the end of each day. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: automatically upon receipt of settlement instruction. 
•  The CMU monitors participants’ cash and securities accounts on a continuous basis. 
•  Securities lending: in December 1997, HKMA introduced a securities lending 
programme for eligible private debt instruments held through the CMU. 
•  Buy-in: no established buy-in procedures. Generally, counterparties renegotiate the 
settlement of any failed trades. 
India: National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL) 
Settlement process 
•  The inter-broker settlement model is similar to BIS Model 3, whereas the broker-
custodian settlement process resembles BIS Model 2. 
•  Settlement does not occur on a simultaneous basis. 
Settlement process: clearing house trades 
•  Settlement cycle: TD+2 rolling settlement basis.  
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•  Custodian banks advise the clearing house on TD+1 of its intent to settle on TD+2. 
•  Once a custodian confirms the trade to the clearing house, settlement is binding. 
•  To effect settlement, the custodian delivers cash or securities to the clearing house 
during pay-in and receives securities or cash from the clearing house during payout. 
•  The period between pay-in and completion of payout is four to eight hours. 
•  On pay-in date, securities are transferred to a “pool” account at the NSDL for further 
credit to the clearing house’s account during the day. 
•  The net cash amount is paid by cheque to the clearing house on TD+2 (at 10.30 
am). 
•  On TD+2, the clearing house transfers securities through the NSDL (at 2 pm). 
Settlement process: hand delivery trades 
•  Settlement occurs outside of the clearing house. 
•  To settle a trade, both delivery and receipt instruction have to be put in NSDL 
system. 
•  On settlement date, brokers initiate payment either by account transfer or by 
cheque. 
•  Cheques (over INR 100,000 (about USD 2,050)) submitted prior to 10.30 am on SD 
or cheques (under INR 100,000), presented on SD–1 before noon receive same 
day value. 
•  As soon as the investor receives cleared funds or securities, delivery of securities or 
payment to the broker is initiated (no fixed cutoff time). 
•  Transfer of securities is final and irrevocable. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: not mandatory and outside the depository. Generally, only matched 
instructions are entered in the depository system for settlement. 
•  Securities lending: While securities lending exists, foreign investors cannot borrow 
securities in accordance with local regulations. 
•  Buy-in: Short positions between brokers are resolved through auctions on SD+1 for 
settlement on SD+2. If securities cannot be bought in the auction, the trade is 
closed out as per SEBI guidelines. Special rules apply for failed trades near ex-date. 
India: Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
Settlement process 
•  For larger trades (above NIR 200 million), the counterparties must indicate whether 
settlement will occur through the clearing house, CCIL or directly with RBI. 
•  As all participants maintain cash accounts with the RBI, payments are settled 
through the central bank accounts. 
Settlement process: settlement via CCIL - BIS Model 2 
•  The CCIL generates a securities and cash obligations report for each participant. 
•  CCIL sends details of the participants’ gross securities and net cash obligations to 
RBI.  
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•  Upon verification that the securities and cash are available, the RBI debits and 
credits securities on a gross basis and subsequently processes the net cash 
settlement. 
•  CCIL receives settlement confirmation from RBI and informs its members. 
Settlement process: settlement with RBI directly - BIS Model 1 
•  On SD (no specific time), RBI initiates simultaneous transfer of securities and cash if 
sufficient positions are available. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: between counterparties. The matching is binding and the trade is 
designated “ready for settlement” on the system, viewable by both the RBI and the 
CCIL. 
•  Securities lending: Repos exist, foreign investors are not permitted to borrow 
securities. 
•  Buy-in: under both methods, if sufficient balances are not available, settlement is 
postponed until the counterparties resolve the discrepancies and/or shortages (this 
eliminates principal risk, but not market risk). 
•  RBI levies strict penalties on participants for settlement failures. 
Indonesia: Bank Indonesia (BI) 
Settlement process: in February 2004, BI introduced its BI-SSSS (Bank Indonesia - Scripless 
Securities Settlement System). Even though it is still too early to assess the performance of 
this new system accurately, a few general observations can be made: 
•  The scripless system is a big step forwards from the previous manual process. 
•  The new scripless settlement model conforms with BIS Model 1. 
•  With the implementation of SSSS, government bonds and SBIs are settled on a 
DVP basis, through the securities and payment systems, SSSS and RTGS. 
•  The scripless system is expected to reduce operational risk and improve the 
efficiency of the government bond settlement infrastructure. 
•  Paper forms are eliminated and securities module linked to the RTGS payment 
system. 
Japan: Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
•  Settlement at the BOJ occurs in book entry form either on DVP or non-DVP basis. 
Settlement process: DVP basis - BIS Model 1 
•  Settlement cycle: rolling TD+3 settlement basis via the new JGB book entry system. 
•  Settlement occurs on a real-time gross DVP basis between 9 am and 3 pm. 
•  Due to the real-time nature of the process, sufficient securities/cash balances are 
required. 
•  Pending securities receipts, pending receipts of funds or pre-advised funds are not 
considered good securities or funds until received.  
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•  Prearranged credit line can be arranged to cover cash obligations, restricted to JGB 
settlement only. The use of the credit facility must be fully collateralised and will 
incur an intraday funding costs. 
Settlement process: non-DVP basis - no BIS model applies - cash settled on a net basis on 
SD by 2.30 pm and securities on an RTGS basis by 12 pm. 
•  Securities are settled on an RTGS basis at the BOJ. Cash settlement usually occurs 
on a net basis via the Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing System (FXYCS). 
•  If the cash account is not properly funded, an intraday overdraft limit will be used. 
•  Cash is settled during a batch run at the end of the day, therefore, no intraday 
funding cost or intraday line usage charges apply. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: either by phone or through the NTT matching system on TD+1. Not 
binding. 
•  Securities lending: lending is allowed in the Japan market, subject to stringent 
conditions with regards to tenure and collateral requirements. 
•  Buy-in: no formal buy-in practices. JGB fails are generally resolved directly by the 
counterparties through mutually negotiated interest claims. If a trade fails and 
remains outstanding for more than 10 business days, a buy-in may be initiated. 
Korea: Korea Securities Depository (KSD) 
Settlement process: BIS Model 3 
•  Settlement cycle: negotiable but generally on a rolling TD+2 basis. 
•  Securities are settled on a gross basis through the KSD whilst the cash transfers 
occur through BOKWire (amounts above KRW  1  billion) or manager’s cheque 
(amounts less than KRW 1 billion). 
•  Under the Institutional Affirmation & Settlement System (INAS), KSD acts as an 
intermediary to all payment obligations through its account with the Bank of Korea, 
but does not assume participants’ default risk. 
•  Brokers use proprietary holdings to settle if investors hold insufficient positions. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: indirect participants prematch trades against the electronic trade report 
received from KSD. If discrepancies occur, amended details are sent to the KSD 
and new trade reports are generated. 
•  Unmatched transactions which were not rectified are not included in the net position 
report and can only be settled directly between the broker and the underlying 
investor. 
•  Buy-in: as per local regulations, buy-in/sell-out on SD+2. 
•  If an investor continues to fail his obligations, the regulator may impose sanctions, 
including the suspension of the Investment Registration Card (IRC). 
•  Securities lending/borrowing: KSD established detailed procedures/acts as 
intermediary.  
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Malaysia: Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
Settlement process: BIS Model 1 
•  Settlement cycle: negotiable but generally occurs on TD+1. 
•  Once a trade is completed, details are uploaded and validated in SSTS. 
•  SSTS transmits an unconfirmed sale/delivery advice to the receiving party. 
•  On SD, the receiving party confirms the transaction in SSTS. 
•  SSTS initiates the transfer in book entry form in the accounts with BNM. 
•  Securities are transferred within SSTS; cash is transferred via BNM’s RTGS 
payment system, RENTAS, by debiting or crediting the participants’ cash accounts 
held at BNM. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: no matching procedures. 
•  Buy-in: in the event a settlement fails, BNM initiates a buy-in. If the securities cannot 
be bought in by 6 pm on settlement date, BNM may reverse the original transaction. 
•  Trades not confirmed by the receiving party remain in the system until cancelled. 
•  Securities lending: lending and borrowing have currently been suspended. 
Philippines: Bureau of Treasury (BTR) 
•  Settlement cycle: same day settlement, ie on trade date (TD). 
•  Cash payments are generally made outside the Registry of Scripless Securities 
(RoSS) and are settled directly between the counterparties. Cash can be settled by 
the BTR but this is very uncommon. 
Settlement process: cash settlement outside RoSS 
•  Upon trade execution, cash is paid on a gross basis by manager’s cheque or 
cashier order. 
•  Cheque or cashier orders deposited before 12 noon are given same day value. 
•  Once payment is made, settlement details are uploaded and confirmed into RoSS 
and transactions are matched by the BTR. 
•  Matched trades are settled on a gross basis before the end of the day (no specified 
time). 
Settlement process: cash settlement through the central bank - BIS Model 2 
•  For matched trades, the BTR prepares payment obligations and instructs the central 
bank to make the appropriate cash transfers. 
•  The BTR transfers securities on a gross settlement basis in RoSS. 
•  Although lines of credit are available to cover insufficient cash balances, generally, 
instructions are not uploaded into RoSS if funds are not available. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: through RoSS on trade date. Unmatched trades are considered as failed 
and are automatically deleted from the RoSS system. 
•  Buy-in: no established procedures.  
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•  Securities lending/borrowing: no established procedures. 
Singapore: Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
Settlement process: BIS Model 1 
•  Settlement cycle: (TD+1) for regular trades and on trade date (TD) for cash trades. 
•  Regular trades, affirmed on TD, settle at 9 am on TD+1 on a true DVP basis. In the 
event of disagreement, buyer can resolve issues with seller up to 4.30 pm on TD+1. 
•  Cash trades, once confirmed, settle on a true DVP basis. 
•  Settlement (securities and cash) occurs on a gross basis. 
•  Settlement occurs through MAS Electronic Payment System (MEPS), an RTGS 
system for high value interbank fund transfers (IFT) and scripless Singapore 
Government Securities (SGS). 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: trade affirmation/confirmation via MEPS. Amendments subject to mutual 
agreement, provided settlement has not occurred. If a dispute is not resolved, the 
matter is referred to the SGS Market committee for a final decision. 
•  Buy-in: no established buy-in procedures. 
•  Securities lending: a repo facility is available for primary dealers, allowing them to 
borrow benchmark issues. 
Taiwan: Taiwan Securities Central Depository (TSCD) 
Settlement process: BIS Model 3 
•  Settlement cycle: TD+1. 
•  Matched transaction reports are sent to the TSCD, the direct and the indirect 
participants. 
•  TSCD prepares summary reports with matched trades and net securities/cash 
obligations for every broker. Discrepancies must be reported to TSE/TSCD before 
the end of TD+1. 
•  On SD (TD+1), participants verify and confirm settlement details. If verification is 
not possible before the settlement cutoff time, brokers may cancel the trade, or 
settle it with an undertaking to resolve any disputes with the investor at a later date. 
•  Securities are automatically transferred into the buyer’s account at the TSCD during 
the overnight batch-run, unless a failed trade is reported by the broker to the TSE. 
•  The securities are available only if payment has been confirmed on SD+1. Any 
delivery failure should be reported to the TSE in the evening of SD. 
•  Cash is settled via an electronic interbank wire transfer system on SD+1 based on 
the net cash obligations indicated on the summary report for on-exchange trades. 
•  The TSE reports any payment defaults to the TSCD, which puts a hold on the 
securities in the defaulting broker/ investor’s account at the TSCD. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: automated and binding between brokers through FAST trading system. 
Indirect participants prematch trades based on the brokers’ trade execution report.  
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•  Buy-in: failed trades are prohibited and may cause the investor’s investment license 
to be revoked for three years. 
•  Securities lending: TSCD does not have any securities lending and borrowing 
programme. However, foreign investors are allowed to lend stocks to local 
borrowers (ie brokers) who need to cover settlement shortfalls due to failed trades or 
transaction errors. 
Thailand: Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
Settlement process: BIS Model 1 
•  Settlement cycle: rolling TD+2 settlement basis. 
•  On SD, for matched instructions, BAHTNET/2 checks the availability of securities 
and cash and settles securities only upon receipt of funds. 
•  Government securities are cleared and settled electronically on a gross delivery 
versus payment (DVP) basis through BOT’s BAHTNET/2 system, the country’s 
RTGS system. 
•  Matched instructions that were not settled due to insufficient cash or securities are 
automatically deleted at the end of the day. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: via phone. Matched instructions can be deleted only upon mutual 
agreement. 
•  Buy-in: no established procedures. 
Thailand: Thailand Securities Depository Co Limited (TSCD) 
Settlement process: BIS Model 3 
•  Settlement cycle: rolling TD+3 settlement basis. 
•  On SD, the TSD nets securities and cash obligations. The TSD effects net cash 
transfers from the TSD BAHTNET account at BOT about 45 minutes after the 
transfer of securities and only upon ascertaining the availability of the securities. 
•  If the event shares or funds are not available, the TSD must be informed and a new 
net report is generated before settlement. 
•  If there are insufficient funds, the TSD uses the Equity Clearing Fund to settle the 
trade. On SD+1, the TSD will sell the securities to reimburse the Clearing Fund and 
related costs and impose a fine on the defaulting broker. 
Risk mitigators 
•  Matching: through the TSD Net Clearing system. The matching process is not 
binding for custodian banks. 
•  Buy-in: initiated on TD+5 for settlement on TD+8. 
•  Securities lending: mandatory borrowing programme. TSD acts as a principal, for 
the account of the broker. This programme is subject to stringent rules and 
penalties.  
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